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Abstract—Vehicular Delay Tolerant Networking (VDTN) is
a special instance of Vehicular Ad hoc Networking (VANET)
and in particular Delay Tolerant Networking (DTN) that utilizes
infrastructure to enhance connectivity in challenged environ-
ments. While VANETs assume end-to-end connectivity, DTNs and
VDTNs do not. Such networks are characterized by dynamic
topology, partitioning due to lack of end-to-end connectivity,
and opportunistic encounters between nodes. Notably, VDTNs
enhances the capabilities DTNs to provide support for delay and
intermittent connectivity. Hence, they can easily ﬁnd applicability
in the early stages of the deployment of vehicular networks
characterized by low infrastructure deployment as is obtainable
in rural areas and in military communications. Privacy imple-
mentation and evaluation is a major challenge in VDTNs. Group
communication has become one of the well discussed means for
achieving effective privacy and packet routing in ad hoc networks
including VDTNs. However, most existing privacy schemes lack
ﬂexibility in terms of the dynamics of group formation and
the level of privacy achievable. Again, it is difﬁcult to evaluate
privacy for sparse VDTNs for rural area and early stages of
deployment. This paper reports on an improved privacy scheme
based on group communication scheme in VDTNs. We analyze
the performance of our model in terms of trade-off between
privacy and performance based on delivery overhead and message
delivery ratio using simulations. While this is a work in progress,
we report that our scheme offers considerable improvement
against other group communication based schemes described in
literature.
Keywords—Anonymity, Privacy, Vehicular Delay Tolerant Net-
works, VDTN, DTN, VANET.
I. INTRODUCTION
Following the emergence of delay tolerant networks
(DTNs) as a solution for connectivity in challenged envi-
ronments such as deep space communication, Vehicular Ad
hoc Networks (VANETs), disaster recovery networks, and
underwater networks, a new class of ad hoc networks have
emerged aptly regarded as Vehicular Delay Tolerant Networks
(VDTNs). While conventional ad hoc networks assume end-
to-end connectivity from source to destination nodes, VDTNs
do not. Hence, packets(also called bundles) are routed using
a store-carry-and-forward mechanism otherwise called oppor-
tunistic routing. Therefore, packet forwarding is dependent
on the probability that contact is made between source and
destination nodes. Most often, the nodes in such networks are
memory and battery constrained, a node therefore can only
carry a packet for as long as it has enough battery life or
memory space to queue up the packet, else it drops the packet.
Vehicles in ad hoc networks are often referred to as nodes in
various literature, therefore we use nodes and vehicles to refer
to the same entity in this paper.
Deployment of DTNs with large vehicle density can suffer
from abysmal performance especially if there is no adequate
infrastructure support to assist in routing packet especially in
the early stages of deployment. To alleviate this and ensure
a reasonable trade-off between cost and efﬁciency, road-side
units (RSUs) can be introduced to enable Vehicle to Infrastruc-
ture (V2I) communication. However, due to high deployment
cost, pervasive deployment of RSUs may not be economically
feasible. With the incorporation of RSUs, VDTNs optimize the
capabilities of VANETs and adapts it to suit classical DTN
environments and ensure support for the partitioning in the
network. The RSUs offers two main advantages for VDTNs.
First, since RSUs are not memory and battery-constrained, they
can temporarily store packets until the next forwarding vehicle
is in range to carry-and-forward the packets [1]. Secondly, the
RSUs facilitate auxiliary security functions as well improve
contact opportunity with vehicle in highly dense locations as
described in [2].
Each vehicle driven by a human in a VDTN is an in-
stantiation of a mobile node. Similar to classical VANETs,
vehicles exchange safety messages in the form of beacons
containing location information used to keep each other in-
formed about events such as accidents and trafﬁc conditions.
Unfortunately, the regularly exchanged beacons can be utilized
by an adversarial vehicles to infer the source (identity of a
vehicle) of a message and track its location with some degree
of accuracy. Clearly, the closely coupled relationship between
drivers and vehicles leads to two privacy issues. First, without
proper access control, it opens up a loophole for easy tracking
of vehicles by an adversary - location privacy. Secondly, since
tracking a vehicle is as good as tracking its driver, it leads to
identity privacy concerns. Of course, tracking a vehicle is as
good as tracking its driver - privacy issues.
Security and privacy remains a key factor that will affect
customers perception and acceptance of vehicular communi-
cation e.g. vehicular communication for intelligent transport
systems(ITS). Since the past few years, security and privacy
in vehicular communication has received considerable atten-
tion from both industry and academia. Sadly, security and
privacy schemes tailored for conventional ad hoc networks
do not suit VDTN environments [3]. Hence, most traditional
security and privacy techniques that are easily applicable in
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traditional networks cannot be directly applied to VDTNs
without modiﬁcation. In its use case for vehicular communi-
cation, privacy provisioning in VDTN is compulsory in order
to ensure the protection of the privacy of civilian drivers.
The nature of the adversary further complicates the design
considerations for privacy-enhancing techniques. Due to the
closely knit relationship between vehicles acting as nodes and
drivers, VDTNs are prone to both global and local attacks
i.e. vehicles are driven by humans who may tamper with on-
board electronics. In this paper, we propose a novel privacy-
aware group communication scheme for sparse VDTNs. While
different from other approaches, our scheme makes provision
for vehicles to easily swap groups for improved individual
privacy. Speciﬁcally, our contribution is as follows:
• we identiﬁed the requirements for group communica-
tion in a disconnected environment. Our RSU-aided
packet forwarding scheme ensures a higher delivery
rate for a rural deployment of VDTN.
• our group communication ensures redundancy while
achieving higher delivery ratio in comparison with our
base line scheme.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. We discuss
some related literature in the(SectionII), and describe our
scheme and attacker models in Section III. Our enhanced
privacy scheme is discussed in Section IV. In Section V,
we evaluate the schemes using simulation studies, and ﬁnally
conclude and present our future work in Section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
The major highlight of this paper, namely privacy by
group communication has been proposed in different literature
[4]. There is a consensus in literature on privacy protection
using frequently changing pseudonyms in VANETs [5]. In
pseudonym communication, vehicles are pre-loaded with a set
of pseudonyms, P by a certiﬁcate authority (CA). To send
a message m, a vehicle chooses a pseudonym pi from P
set of pseudonyms to sign m. Pseudonymous communication
prevents the adversary from linking a vehicle to the messages
they exchange to its real identity. The vehicles are equipped
with a pool of multiple pseudonyms from which the vehicles
can select what pseudonym to use at regular intervals (e.g.
every 5 minutes) such that a pseudonym used at time tn is not
the same as that at tn+1. To further ensure a higher level of
privacy protection, vehicles can synchronize their pseudonym
change with other vehicles willing to change pseudonyms at
coordinated positions and time. Several works in literature pro-
pose that pseudonym change be done at locations where they
are enough vehicles willing to agree to change pseudonyms
e.g road intersections and car parks.
The author in [6] describe the concept of mix zones and its
variants such as Density Zones and Social spots for effectively
changing pseudonyms. An ideal mixed zone can be crowded
locations such as social spots [2] and road intersections where
vehicles can distract attackers by changing their pseudonyms
securely. Sugou et al proposed a speciﬁc use of mix zones for
location privacy in DTNs [7]. Usually, this requires a group
of vehicles that can change pseudonyms at the mix zone -
the more the number of vehicles, the higher the anonymity
enjoyed by individual vehicles. However, the scheme does suit
VDTNs due to their disconnected nature. Again, in resource
constrained networks such as VDTNs, some selﬁsh vehicles
may not be willing to change pseudonyms [8]. For instance,
vehicles with diminishing battery power may decide to sleep
and save energy instead of engaging in exchange of signal
messages needed to ﬁnd suitable vehicles willing to change
pseudonyms.
Similar to mix zones, techniques based on radio silence
include Silent Periods and Silent Cascades where vehicles
can cease beacon transmission by temporarily switching off
their radios [9]. Such radio-silence based methods have been
criticised to undermine the critical safety objectives of ve-
hicular networks for use in ITS. Tor [10] has been the
most popularly implemented anonymity network based on the
concept of mixing [5]. Mixed networks send packets along a
cascade of proxy nodes otherwise called mixes. Mixes store
and forward batches of layer-encrypted packets, both batching
and encryption ensures that mix inputs and outputs cannot be
correlated. Mixed networks in all its variations are based on
source routing, are highly inefﬁcient and cannot be applied in
VDTNs since a deﬁnite end-to-end path does not exist. Identity
Based Encryption (IBE) using a Private Key Generator (PKG)
to dynamically generate pseudonyms is used in [11]. Unfortu-
nately, their approach relies on trusted gateways to operate and
requires periodic updates from the PKG which are single points
of failure. One of the schemes for anonymous communication
in DTNs uses Identity-Based Cryptography (IBC). The scheme
proposes combining users’ identities with location identiﬁers.
To achieve scalability, it recommends the use of a hierarchical
identity-based cryptography (HIBC). However, the proposal
assumes the presence of trusted gateways with full knowledge
of user identities. Similar to the IBE scheme, it is not suitable
for a partitioned VDTN as the gateways can easily become
single points of failure.
In summary, a variety of anonymity schemes proposed
for VDTNs are often borrowed from techniques in traditional
VANETs and is not suitable for VDTNs. It is therefore hard
to export privacy schemes tailored for DTNs and expect them
to work for VDTNs without modiﬁcation. In particular, most
routing protocols tailored for DTNs rely on shared node
information to forward bundles and hence identity information
is revealed. Although, we have used in built routing protocols,
we justify our decision later on.
Our privacy scheme is closely related to the schemes in
[12] and [13]. These methods are based on the concept of
group communication where a source (.i.e group) chooses the
path to the destination prior to sending a packet. Group com-
munication techniques are more suitable for dense networks
since redundancy is ensured through multiple communication
paths contributed by the numerous number of vehicles in the
network. It also ensures eventual packet delivery in case of
node failure due to attack. However, it does not suit the
sparsely populated VDTN since they may not be enough
vehicles to form groups. We describe how we overcome this
challenge in our scheme later.
III. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we present a detailed description of our
system, assumptions and the attributes of the adversary against
whom we defend the network.
A. Network Model
We consider VDTN deployment in a rural area as described
in [14]. Our network can be modelled as a directed multi-
graph as follows: G = (V ,E) where V and E denote some
set of vehicles and contact edges respectively. Our scenario
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makes use of road-side units (RSUs) as stationary relay nodes
to facilitate efﬁcient packet routing. As described in [15],
the authors show that the performance of DTNs can be
greatly enhanced by effectively deploying RSUs in vehicular
networks. We only deploy RSUs at strategic locations as in
[16]. During each contact duration D, we assume that the
source and destination vehicle can exchange a message m
characterized by the following set of attributes: (IDi, l, v, t),
where IDi is a pseudonym identity of a vehicle, l is the location
of the vehicles (a Global Positioning System (GPS) could be
used to manage location services), v is its speed, while t is the
time-stamp information.
B. Adversary Model
We consider a global passive adversary in our model.
The adversary can monitor all forms of communication and
signalling messages traversing the entire network, and is
able to partially control a subset(e.g. 10 - 20%) of vehicles
in the network. However, the adversary does not possess
cryptographic details of the vehicles and so cannot decrypt
sensitive messages. We assume that the RSUs are trustworthy
and tamper-proof.
Our analysis considers privacy attacks in the form of packet
analysis and tracking attacks for location and identity privacy
violation. To be able to execute packet analysis attacks, the
adversary can delay the message delivery for a considerable
amount of time while analysing it to divulge information
regarding source and destination vehicles.
IV. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
Our scheme addresses cooperative privacy utilizing a group
communication framework similar to the schemes in [12] and
[13]. Different from the above schemes, we introduce the
following improvements to our scheme:
• our scheme leverage RSUs for a more efﬁcient bundle
forwarding
• by intelligently assigning nodes to groups, our scheme
maximizes privacy by ensuring that group membership
is restricted to a threshold for improved privacy.
Our protocol aim to achieve both location and identity pri-
vacy. In this regard, anonymity is achieved if an identiﬁable
information such as identity and location of a vehicle cannot
be known with certainty by the adversary (i.e. a vehicle is in-
distinguishable from other in the network). Therefore, vehicle
anonymity depends on the number of other indistinguishable
vehicles - otherwise called the anonymity set size (ASS) in the
network. Mathematically, the privacy enjoyed by a node can be
expressed in terms of entropy and degree of anonymity (DoA)
using Shanon’s equation [17] based on information theory as
follows. If X is discrete random variable with a probability
mass function P(X=i) where i = 1 to n for the different values
of X, then the entropy H(X) can be expressed as in (1).
H(X) = −
N∑
i=1
pi log2 pi, (1)
The DoA [18] assumes that the AS has a number of suspect
indistinguishable vehicles with possible link to an action (e.g.
sending a message). Assuming the adversary has no priori in-
formation about the system, we express the maximum entropy
as (Hmax) in 2
Hmax = log(n) (2)
Hence, the adversary can gain Hmax – H(X) after an attack
on the system. The DoA is assessed on a scale of 0 to 1, hence
the maximum entropy of a subject is expressed as in 3 below.
d = 1− Hmax −H(X)
Hmax
=
H(X)
Hmax
(3)
The privacy as expressed above depends on the number of
participants in the network and the level of correctness by the
adversary in associating an action to a vehicle. For example, in
a network of two vehicles exchanging messages or changing
pseudonyms, the probability of the adversary guessing a sub-
ject is (P(1/2) = 0.5). The probability is expressed as the ability
of the adversary to link a vehicle to the action of say sending
a message or changing its pseudonym at a point in time.
However, in our scheme, we also measure the performance
based on two utility factors, privacy as expressed above in
addition to time delay incurred in forwarding a bundle to its
destination through rings of groups as expressed in 4. While
vehicles are privacy protected through group communication,
it takes some time for vehicles to form or join groups to be
able to forward messages. Note that we set a threshold for the
number of vehicles that can form a group, if the threshold
is met, a group is formed to forward packet. Our scheme
accounts for this time delay. For each simulation run, we
measure the performance utility, UT as expressed in 4 and
5 where UPrivacy and UDelay are privacy and delay functions
respectively. We average our values over 30 simulation runs.
UT = UPrivacy + UDelay (4)
(4) can further be expressed in terms of the normalization
co-efﬁcients α and β associated with the network as shown in
5, where α = 1 - β.
UT = α(UPrivacy) + β(UDelay) (5)
The values taken by α and β depends on the level of
privacy a user intends to achieve. We assume the default
minimum values of of 0.5 (i.e. α = 0.5, β = 0.5). However,
the user can adjust the privacy settings to suit need even on
initiation. In our evaluation, we vary these values for different
simulation runs to arrive at our results.
For simplicity, if we take the privacy to be entropy as
expressed in (1) and substitute in (4) thus:
UT = α(H(X)) + β(UDelay) (6)
The anonymity depends on the anonymity set size as well
as on the amount of trafﬁc generated by the nodes participating
in the network. The amount of trafﬁc generated at any point in
time is directly proportional to the number of active vehicles
exchanging messages. Hence, trafﬁc analysis attack becomes
more challenging for the attacker.
Group Formation: Our network comprises vehicles and
RSUs as described in Section III. The RSUs form stationary
relay nodes to assist in forwarding packets. Our model assumes
the presence of an off-line Trusted Key Manager (TKM) that
assigns keys and certiﬁcates to network entities. We assume the
network has V vehicles V = {v0, v1, v2, ..., vL} and predeﬁned
groups on initiation G = {g0, g1, g2, ..., gL}. Each vehicle
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vi ∈ V belongs to at least one gi ∈ G. However, there is a
minimum Tmin and maximum threshold Tmax for the number
of vehicles, n that belongs to a group at a time, {Tmin ≤ n
≤ Tmax}. Our system assumes that each vehicle vi possesses
a pair of public and private keys {P ib , P ir}, a pair of group
public and private keys for the group to which they belong,
{G ib , G ir} as well as individual and group digital certiﬁcates
Vc and Gc assigned by an off-line trusted key manager (TKM).
Since the number of active nodes in a group or network is
proportional to the trafﬁc generated per time, we utilized the
threshold as a means of further ensuring privacy since it is
difﬁcult for an adversary to correlate multiple simultaneous
trafﬁc from multiple sources [13] as efﬁciently as it can from
a single source. Hence, our group communication scheme
achieves redundancy and privacy depends on the number of
nodes within each group. We summarize the group formation
process in Algorithm 1 below.
Algorithm 1 Group Formation
1: procedure INPUT(G, V) → G is the number of groups,
V is the set of vehicles
2: set thresholds (tmax, tmin)
3: random factor r ← Random()
4: GetNodes(vi) ← V
5: group change formation and change request:
6: for each vehicle vi ∈ V do
7: add vi to a random group r(gi ∈ G)
8: end for
9: if gi < Tmin then send group and pseudonym change
request m = {IDi, l, v, t} (vehicle joins a new group of
request is granted)
10: end if
11: end procedure
Performance Considerations: The discontinuity of connec-
tions in VDTNs already impacts performance attributes such
as end-to-end delay, latency, and average hop count. With the
implementation of security and privacy-enhancing techniques,
further performance degradation will be most likely. We anal-
yse the usual metrics for performance evaluation namely delay,
latency and hop count as well as the impact of privacy settings
on the system.
V. SIMULATION AND EVALUATION
In this section, we describe our experiments and conduct
performance evaluation of our scheme.
A. Simulation Setup
We implement our scheme using a popular and widely
used simulator for delay tolerant networks namely the Op-
portunistic Networking Environment (ONE) simulator [19].
The ONE simulator has been used to investigate application
scenarios for VDTNs as promoted in [3] and used in [1].
Unless otherwise stated, our simulation runs involves 50 – 300
vehicles and 5 stationary relay nodes as RSUs. Table I presents
a detailed summary of our simulation parameters. The vehicles
are distributed on the map of the City of Helsinki (measuring
5000 x 5000m) extracted in the ONE Simulator while the
RSUs are placed at carefully chosen intersections. We partition
the entire map into multiple regions, each region represents a
starting point for each group as described earlier. In accordance
with Finnish trafﬁc regulations, we set an average lower and
upper speed bounds for each vehicle as 30 – 60kmh−1 (i.e.
from 8.30ms−1 to 16.70ms−1). The relay nodes plays the
dual role of facilitating packet forwarding as well as acting
as Roadside Units (RSUs) in a resource-constrained rural or
military deployment. Since vehicles usually follow deﬁned
routes in the form of roads, our model assumes each vehicle
follows a shortest path map-based movement mobility model
where vehicles are ﬁrst situated randomly on different spots
on road and then allowed to travel along predeﬁned routes to
their destination.
Most routing protocols for delay tolerant networks depends
on contact information to route packets, we assume that the
vehicles exchange using pseudonyms issued by the TKM as
described in Section III. We conduct our experiment only on
top of First Contact and Direct Delivery routing protocol as
they only maintain limited copies of packets in the network
[20]. In the former, only a single copy of the message is
generated by source node and forwarded to the next available
contact until the message reaches its destination, while the
later routes packets based on transfer probability. Transfer
probability implies that a sender chooses to send a packet or
retain a copy based on some probability. In our experiment
we refer to a single node and the group to which it belongs as
source and destinations. However, other routing protocols can
be considered for evaluating our scheme but we leave that to
our future work.
TABLE I. SIMULATION PARAMETERS
Parameter Description
Duration 12 hrs
Number of vehicles; RSUs 50, 100, 150, 200, 250, 300 vehi-
cle; 5 RSUs
Speed limit 30 kmh−1 – 60 kmh−1
Transmission coverage 100 m
Mobility model Shortest path map based movement
Packet size 500k – 1M
Message generation interval 25 s – 35s
B. Performance Evaluation
In this section, we analyse the performance of our model
based on three metrics popularly used for evaluating the
performance of delay tolerant networks: the utility ratio (UT )
as described in Section IV, delivery ratio, average delay and
time to live(TTL) and in addition to group hop count as our per-
formance metrics. The delivery ratio accounts for the fraction
of total total generated messages that are successfully delivered
to their ﬁnal destination within a speciﬁed time; the average
delay reﬂects time measured between message generation from
source to its successful delivery at the destination nodes; the
TTL is the time limit within which a message should be
delivered to its destination successfully. Our choice of the
TTL is particularly crucial as it represents the ability of the
group protocol to deliver messages on schedule. The group
hop count gives an indication of how many paths a packet
is routed through to its destination. The group hop count
therefore records each group traversed by a packet carried by
a vehicle as it journeys from one path of the map to the other.
1) Utility Ratio: Different from other conventional per-
formance metrics, we utilised the utility ratio as one of our
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Fig. 1. Variation of utility ratio with vehicle density
performance metrics. We observe that the utility ratio in Figure
1 for both First Contact and Direct Delivery protocols does
not show a major difference. As this is only a preliminary
work, this behaviour is subject to further experimentation in
the future to establish this behaviour even with other routing
protocols.
2) Delivery Ratio: Figure 2 shows the variation in delivery
ratio with different vehicle densities. As a baseline for com-
parison, from the ﬁgure, we show that our scheme achieved
a higher delivery ratio for First Contact and Direct Delivery
routing protocols compared to the results in the scheme pre-
sented in [12]. As stated earlier, our group communication
scheme ensures redundancy, hence eventual packet delivery to
its destination. The higher delivery ratio validates the notion
of RSU-assisted packet forwarding in our scheme.
Fig. 2. Variation of overhead ratio with vehicle density
3) Average Latency: In Figure 3, we show the variation
in latency for different vehicle densities. We observe that
vehicular density or our choice of routing protocol has no
signiﬁcant impact on the latency. However, this scenario could
be repeated for other routing protocols such as Epidemic and
Spray & Wait routing protocols as part of our future studies.
4) Time to Live(TTL): The delivery ratio for various TTL
is as shown in Figures 4 and 5. For this scenario, we varied
Fig. 3. Average latency variation with vehicle density
the TTL from 5 to 30 minutes for vehicles densities ranging
from 150 to 250. We compare our results to that scheme in [7].
However, our scheme considers only First Contact and Direct
Delivery routing protocols. Similar to [7], there is a gradual
increase in delivery ratio as the vehicle density increases from
150 to 250. The lower values achieved in our scheme is due to
the routing protocols used. While our baseline scheme assumed
multi-copy routing protocols, we used single copy routing
protocols.
Fig. 4. Delivery ratio for different TTL for ﬁrst contact routing protocol
5) Group Hop Count: The group hop count is an indication
of how many hops a message is routed through from source
to destination. We observe that First Contact performs about
45% less that direct contact in routing a single message. This
means that for the same vehicle density, ﬁrst contact will take
about 45% increase in the number of hops a packet would go
through to reach its destination.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we have developed a group communication
scheme for privacy enhancement in vehicular delay tolerant
networks. By adopting different groups, our scheme ensures
redundancy and a more efﬁcient packet delivery from source
to destination. We introduced RSU-assisted forwarding where
each RSU acts as a coordinator for the vehicles within its
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Fig. 5. Delivery ratio for different TTL for direct delivery routing protocol
Fig. 6. Group hop count for varying vehicle density
transmission range. Our ongoing future work involves novel
group swapping and RSU-assisted pseudonym changing al-
gorithm through the use of mix-zones. We shall investigate
the authentication and re-keying mechanisms against malicious
nodes and evaluate our scheme against more advanced privacy
attacks such timing attacks.
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